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Abstract 
In 2003, the Department of Defense directed that Evolutionary Acquisition 
(EA), often referred to as spiral development, become the preferred approach for 
the acquisition of major weapon systems. Under EA, development, testing, 
production and fielding of a system take place in increments, once the system 
reaches a certain stage of maturity.  We contend that EA was adopted without 
consideration of the impact of this approach on logistics support of the system.  The 
result could be degradation of support to each increment of the system and of 
operational availability.  We recommend policy changes that could mitigate the 
effect of EA on logistics support by elevating the role that logistics play in the testing 
and milestone approval process for systems acquired using this approach. 
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Introduction 
Evolutionary Acquisition (EA), sometimes referred to as spiral development 
(SD), is a program-management approach intended to reduce the cost of weapon 
systems by faster fielding, reduced development costs and a greater opportunity to 
assess operational performance before the end of production (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 
2005, August, p. 28).  EA has been defined as follows: 
Evolutionary acquisition is the preferred DOD strategy for rapid acquisition of 
mature technology for the user. An evolutionary approach delivers capability 
in increments, recognizing, up front, the need for future capability 
improvements. The objective is to balance needs and available capability with 
resources, and to put capability into the hands of the user quickly. The 
success of the strategy depends on consistent and continuous definition of 
requirements, and the maturation of technologies that lead to disciplined 
development and production of systems that provide increasing capability 
towards a materiel concept. (Retrieved June 28, 2007 from Acquisition 
Community Connection portal, https://acc.dau.mil, definition of Evolutionary 
Acquisition, Undated, no stable URL) 
While EA is distinctly attractive from the program-management viewpoint, the 
process could lead to a proliferation of configurations (sometimes called “blocks”) of 
a given weapon system, an issue that arises even with traditional acquisition 
practices (sometimes referred to as “single step to full capability” (SSFC)) 
(Congressional Research Service, 2006, May 17).  
For instance, in 2003, the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) was 
employed on 158 ships and featured 308 mounts and 6 baseline configurations. 
Diversity of the system due to different baselines creates unique problems arising 
out of the unique status of the mounts. The different baselines for all these mounts 
necessitate increased logistical complexity to provide necessary spares; this 
complexity likewise causes increased lack of availability of the maintenance 
expertise on the ship and places a heavy burden on inventory managers to carry the 
required spare parts (Apte, 2004, October 1). 
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In short, as configurations proliferate, due to either SSFC or evolutionary 
acquisition policies, so do the logistics challenges of supporting the system, 
particularly in the areas of supply and maintenance.  The block approach in the past 
has had the same problem due to unscheduled, unforeseen maintenance.  A 
common consequence of a spiral approach may be an increase in the diversity of 
parts and, hence, logistics complexity (Apte, 2005, June).  The saving grace for the 
spiral approach may be that its requirements are planned and forecasted due to the 
structure of the process. The spiral approach may have major implications for DOD 
budgeting, spare parts support, maintenance, and training. 
A recent GAO report described the major challenges associated with the 
compressed schedule for development of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter 
(JSF), including logistics supportability. It is notable that the JSF program office has 
not adopted the established EA approach, but a variant meant to meet the unique 
constraints and requirements of that program (GAO, 2006, March 16).  A USAF 
author has also expressed a certain degree of caution regarding the sustainment of 
systems developed using EA: 
While some basic truths never change, Evolutionary Acquisition does, at the 
same time, pose major new and unique challenges for the support 
community. Planning can be more complex when attempting to support 
multiple increments, rather than one final delivery. The issues of configuration 
control and interoperability rise rapidly to the forefront of the planning effort, 
as incremental introduction of warfighting capability increases the chances of 
multiple versions of weapon systems being in use simultaneously.  
Proper planning should allow for a much more structured approach to 
configuration management, which should, in turn, mitigate the risks 
associated with multiple versions and interoperability. Ensuring full-up support 
capability is garnered more rapidly to match the quicker delivery of a weapon 
system operational capability is also among the most basic of those 
challenges. For these reasons, thorough logistics support planning and finely 
tuned, integrated, and coordinated support execution are even more 
important than in the past. (Farmer, 2003, Spring, pp. 27-34) 
A recent National Research Council (NRC) report expressed similar concerns 
about the logistics support aspects of EA at the level of operational test and 
evaluation.  The NAS concluded that structures were not currently in place to ensure 
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that system deficiencies and the nature of operational failures would be identified to 
those organizations responsible for providing support of the fielded system, thus 
ensuring appropriate action could be taken at a sufficiently early stage (Nair & 
Cohen, 2006, p. 4). 
The interplay of EA and logistics, therefore, appears to offer a fruitful area for 
further research.  There is the opportunity to identify EA criteria and decision 
points—where logistics considerations could play a major role in determining the 
downstream supportability of a weapon system, perhaps even to a greater degree 
that with traditional acquisition. 
Since EA remains in its formative stages, and no major weapon system has 
yet been developed and fielded using this approach, there is an opportunity to more 
fully explore EA policy with a view to identifying areas where logistics support issues 
could be more fully addressed. 
It is hoped that this paper will serve to inform the refinement of EA policy and 
practice as it relates to logistics support.  Our goals are the following: 
 Define the relationship of EA to logistics support, particularly with 
respect to the fielding of multiple configurations; 
 Establish the specific areas of logistics support that are most affected 
by EA; 
 Determine which evaluation criteria and decision-making processes in 
EA relate to logistics support; 
 Recommend approaches that could increase the visibility and degree 
of integration of logistics factors in the EA of weapon systems. 
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Policy Context 
Policy direction on EA has been codified through the two key documents 
governing the DOD acquisition system—the DODD 5000.1 and DODI 5000.2.  EA is 
first established as the “preferred approach” as follows: 
4.3. The following policies shall govern the Defense Acquisition System: 
[…] 
4.3.2. Responsiveness. Advanced technology shall be integrated into 
producible systems and deployed in the shortest time practicable. Approved, 
time-phased capability needs matched with available technology and 
resources enable evolutionary acquisition strategies. Evolutionary acquisition 
strategies are the preferred approach to satisfying operational needs. Spiral 
development is the preferred process for executing such strategies. (DOD, 
2003, November 24, paragraph 4.3; emphasis added)  
The above Directive, however, does not define what is meant by either 
evolutionary acquisition or SD.  Further explanation is given in the 
accompanying Instruction: 
3.3. Evolutionary Acquisition 
3.3.1. Evolutionary acquisition is the preferred DOD strategy for rapid 
acquisition of mature technology for the user. An evolutionary approach 
delivers capability in increments, recognizing, up front, the need for future 
capability improvements. The objective is to balance needs and available 
capability with resources, and to put capability into the hands of the user 
quickly. The success of the strategy depends on consistent and continuous 
definition of requirements, and the maturation of technologies that lead to 
disciplined development and production of systems that provide increasing 
capability towards a materiel concept.  
3.3.2. The approaches to achieve evolutionary acquisition require 
collaboration between the user, tester, and developer. They include: 
3.3.2.1. Spiral Development. In this process, a desired capability is identified, 
but the end-state requirements are not known at program initiation. Those 
requirements are refined through demonstration and risk management; there 
is continuous user feedback; and each increment provides the user the best 
possible capability. The requirements for future increments depend on 
feedback from users and technology maturation. 
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3.3.2.2. Incremental Development. In this process, a desired capability is 
identified, an end-state requirement is known, and that requirement is met 
over time by developing several increments, each dependent on available 
mature technology. (DOD, 2003, May 12, paragraph 3.3; emphasis added) 
In simpler terms, two key points emerge from the above guidance: 
1. Systems are to be developed, produced, tested and fielded 
“incrementally” as they reach what are considered to be an acceptable 
state of maturity.  The systems will eventually emerge in a series of 
increments, sometimes referred to as “blocks”—each of which reflects 
the maturity of the system at the time of fielding. 
2. The stated preference for SD over incremental development indicates 
that systems should arguably be fielded without knowledge of the end-
state requirement. 
It is fairly straightforward to understand what brought about the desire for EA 
and SD.  The fact that the DOD (generally) takes too long to develop, produce and 
field weapon systems, which are too expensive, too difficult to operate and support, 
and that they often do not meet user requirements is a truism that is somewhat 
redundant to state here.1  Finally, cost escalation and the stretched-out nature of the 
acquisition of major systems such as ships or aircraft eventually leads to far fewer of 
the end items being delivered than originally envisaged.  For example, the Air Force 
originally stated a requirement for a quantity of 381 of the F-22A Raptor fighter 
aircraft, but now can only afford to buy 183—at a considerably higher unit cost 
(GAO, 2006, June 20).  This syndrome, which is more the rule than the exception for 
major systems acquisition, has been termed the “Conspiracy of Hope,” in which 
products require decades to deliver and cost far more than originally planned 
(Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Project, 2006, February, p. 48). 
                                            
1 The reader is referred to the large number of US Government Accountability Office reports and 
testimonies on the subject of defense acquisition problems (www.gao.gov), as well as studies by the 
RAND Corporation (www.rand.org) and audits by the DOD Inspector General (www.DODig.osd.mil). 
Congress and the DOD have also commissioned numerous external (“Blue Ribbon”) reviews of the 
same issue since at least the 1970s, a recent example of which is the Report of the Defense 
Acquisition Performance Assessment Project (2006, February; see www.acq.osd.mil/dapaproject/).  
Finally, the Naval Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program has funded reports on many 
aspects of current defense acquisition challenges; see www.acquisitionresearch.org. 
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The policy response to the above longstanding answer makes intuitive sense.  
Rather than spend what sometimes ends up being decades developing the ultimate 
weapon system, the DOD can “freeze” the system under development at certain 
intervals.  Production and fielding of the corresponding “increment” will soon follow.  
As the system matures based on technical advances and user feedback, more 
advanced models will be developed.  The result: more systems in operation, in less 
elapsed time, at a lower unit cost.   










THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 - 9 - 
Original Intentions and Implementation Challenges 
The 2003 direction with respect to acquisition generally, and EA in particular, 
may inevitably lead to greater challenges once the system is actually fielded.  The 
military units operating the system will be faced with what could be a large number 
of different “increments” of the same system.  Each increment may have unique 
operational, maintenance, supply, training and personnel requirements.  
Accordingly, the advantages of commonality associated with a long production run of 
identical items are lost in favor of getting the system fielded sooner.   
As stated simply by the GAO, “Programs that start with mature technologies 
do better” (GAO, 2006, March). The traditional approach to DOD major systems 
acquisition has been described “bleeding-edge” or “gold-plated,” meaning that 
systems are put into either Low-rate Initial Production (LRIP) or even full production 
without meaningful testing or technology maturity.  For example, the GAO has stated 
that the JSF is expected to enter LRIP with only 1% of the flight testing having been 
completed.  This is because financial programming constraints force the 
developmental, testing, and production phases to become “pancaked” to the point of 
overlap (GAO, 2006, March 16). 
EA has been intended to mitigate the above problem by dividing each major 
program into increments.  Within each increment, each of the principal milestones 
associated with the acquisition of a system must be met, beginning at milestone B 
(approval for initiation of the System Development and Demonstration phase).2  
According to the report of the NRC workshop cited above, the introduction of EA as 
the “preferred approach” for major DOD systems acquisition has significant benefits 
in preventing requirements creep or gold-plating by creating more opportunities for 
senior management input: 
                                            
2 A useful chart of the nested, cyclical nature of the acquisition approval process using EA is found in 
Dillard (2003, September 29, p. 47). 
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Evolutionary Acquisition provides increased opportunities to better discipline 
the management of acquisition programs.  Decision makers can weed out 
unwarranted optimism in draft “requirements” and choose only mature 
technologies to include in the early stages of acquisition programs.  They can 
delay the introduction of risky, immature technology to future stages. […] 
Demonstrating technological maturity before including the technology in a 
formal acquisition program will eliminate the need to delay the entire 
acquisition program because of one risky technology area or risk using 
technology that not be sufficiently effective or reliable. (Nair & Cohen, 2006, 
p. 23) 
 John Dillard has suggested a contrasting viewpoint to the above optimism.  
He emphasizes that the 2003 DODI 5000.2 and DODD 5000.1significantly increase 
the reporting burden on program managers and elevate the milestone decision 
authority (MDA) for each stage of the program one or more levels higher than 
previously.  In doing so, the 2003 policy has the effect of further demoting the 
attention that PMs and their staffs can devote to actually managing the acquisition—
which would include providing logistics support (Dillard, 2003, September 29, p. 54).   
In Dillard’s view, increased centralization represents an attempt to “take 
control” without remedying many inherently chaotic and contradictory features of the 
acquisition system, such as the conflict between program approvals and the 
availability of funds to execute the appropriate phase.  EA is described as a 
“management control mechanism” where the “time and effort on control activities 
appears almost certainly excessive within the same delivery timeline” (Dillard, 2003, 
September 29, p. 47).  In support of that viewpoint, the CRS has suggested to 
Congress that EA may require additional legislative oversight as compared to SSFC 
programs (Congressional Research Service, 2006, May 17). 
The paradox is that the 2003 DOD direction clearly and repeatedly states that 
support requirements are a key performance parameter for the acquisition of any 
weapon system.  However, with the multiplication of configurations generated by EA, 
and with the preference for SD suggesting that end-state requirements are not 
known at program initiation (and perhaps much later), the support requirements for 
the system acquired under EA may become significantly more complex.   
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The DOD has long been criticized for its lack of performance in supporting 
existing systems that are acquired in a traditional manner, using a smaller number of 
different versions than would be contemplated by EA.  The GAO has designated 
DOD weapon systems acquisition and supply-chain management as two “high risk” 
areas continuously to each new Congress from 1990 to 2007 (GAO, 2007, January).  
If EA is successful at improving the first, what measures might need to be taken to 
mitigate negative impacts on the second, should that prove to be the case?  While 
some parts of the DOD and the defense industry might be rewarded for EA, if the 
resulting systems are significantly more difficult to support, operational effectiveness 
would be compromised.  As explained by the GAO, “DOD does not have an 
environment that facilitates effective program management” (GAO, 2007, March). 
The DOD’s unfathomable size and complexity make almost any reforms 
difficult.  But it is clear that all support systems need to be in place for a weapon 
system to be functional.  EA, with its emphasis on rapid fielding, will require 
significant emphasis on sufficient funding and agile reconfiguration of all support 
systems (including training) that are related to each new increment.  The DOD’s 
performance in SSFC systems has been less than desirable and has long been 
viewed as “high risk”—with inadequate progress being made to address support 
issues over the past two decades.  In addition to the cautions of the GAO, the 
Congressional Research Service has offered the following view: 
Under SSFC, DOD provided information about the entire projected program, 
stretching many years into the future. Such information, supporters of EA/SD 
argue, may appear more complete, but is not very reliable because it requires 
projecting program related events well into the future. DOD’s history in 
accurately projecting such events, they argue, is far from perfect. As a result, 
they argue, information provided in connection with an SSFC weapon 
acquisition program can give Congress the illusion—but not the reality—of 
understanding the outlines of the entire program. On the other hand, critics of 
EA/SD contend that it has the potential for drawing Congress into programs to 
a point where extrication becomes difficult if not impossible, and without a 
clear idea of a program’s ultimate objectives. (2006, May 17) 
EA will require not only that the current significant deficiencies with respect to 
weapon system support be effectively addressed, but that the responsiveness of the 
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massive support “tail” be improved by several orders of magnitude.  Otherwise, the 
cost in degradation of operational availability of incrementally fielded systems may 
be very high to the warfighter. 
Given that the latest version of DODI 5000.2 and DODD 5000.1 were only 
adopted in 2003, it is too early to attempt to locate lessons learned on the impact of 
EA on logistics (or other types of) support to weapon systems.  It was noted above 
that the largest acquisition program in DOD history, the JSF, is not following the EA 
methodology (GAO, 2006, March 16).  A somewhat caustic but relevant insight with 
respect to EA’s impact on logistics was located in a RAND study of EA in defense 
space programs: 
In the colorful phrase of one program manager, it is crucial for EA program 
managers to recognize and plan for the fact that “logistics takes it in the 
shorts” in EA programs. What is meant by this colorful phrase is that EA 
greatly complicates logistics planning (and life-cycle cost analysis) by leading 
to a proliferation of different system configurations as the system evolves 
through its increments or spirals. The best approach to dealing with this 
challenge, in the view of several program managers, is to plan from the 
beginning to back-fit earlier variants to bring them up to the standard of the 
latest configurations, or merely to replace old variants with the current 
versions. The KEI [Kinetic Energy Interceptor] program manager suggests a 
“blast down” solution for old variants, where the earlier versions are 
consumed through use as test vehicles for later stages of the program. 
Whatever the approach, budget planners, cost analysts, and logistics 
planners must be prepared to anticipate and plan for the additional 
complexities and costs that will be incurred through the use of EA by the 
fielding of multiple versions and configurations of the same system. (Lorell, 
Lowell & Younossi, 2006, p. 84-85) 
It is of interest that the RAND study cited above deals with space systems, 
which could, therefore, be viewed as understating the logistics problem dealing with 
physically larger and more complex systems.  Current DOD policy does not, indeed, 
address what will happen to weapons from older increments as the newer models 
are rolled out.  There are many options, some of them due to the nature of the 
system and the types of improvements made (i.e., technical issues).  In the case of 
the RQ-4A Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle, which has been acquired using 
spiral development (SD), the following comment has been made: 
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One [Global Hawk] manager stated, “keeping track of spares requirements 
with multiple configurations is very challenging as each spiral is very 
different.”  This adversely affects LCC [lifecycle cost] since a larger logistical 
footprint increases O&M [Operations and Maintenance] funding dramatically.  
As with any spirally developed program, the Global Hawk program plans to 
add several different capabilities in each spiral. One result of this is differing 
sparing requirements between spirals. Each spiral could have vastly different 
components, thus, multiple types of spare parts for those different 
components. This could become a nightmare for a parts manager.  
[…] 
Since spares are so critical for operational effectiveness, logisticians must 
study spares tradeoffs and encourage parts commonality between spirals. 
This is a challenge for the Global Hawk program as it has roughly only 10 
percent parts commonality between the A model and B model. 
A potential solution to the spares requirements for different spirals is to utilize 
a modular systems approach. If future components “plug and play” with the current 
system architecture, the version of the component used for repair purposes would 
not have as great an impact (Henning & Walter, 2005, December, p. 46). One of the 
authors has noted in previous research that: 
Combining modularization with Spiral Development has the following 
advantages.  Most importantly, the combination will reduce logistic 
complexity. In the private sector, modularization has achieved great results. 
By tailoring it to the DOD’s needs, similar results could be achieved. One of 
the advantages in the private sector is that customers find it easier to make 
their purchase decisions when their initial investment is not completely lost by 
subsequent introduction of superior products. In the DOD, the acquisition 
programs represent the customer. So here, commitment to localizing 
performance improvements and modular development is more effective than 
integral architecture. In other words, amongst defense initiatives, open 
architecture is a “good thing.”  Modular designs are more conducive to a 
faster launch; therefore, from a warfighter’s view, modularity would definitely 
be a great advantage. Likewise, using standard components, a NPMU 
approach might be an attractive option when cost-side advantages are 
factored in. With costs skyrocketing and ships being run as private 
enterprises, this aspect of modularization is worth investigating. (Apte, 2005, 
June, p. 23) 
But there are also potential problems dealing with finding adequate funding to 
upgrade older models, turn them into test articles or training equipment, or even 
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dispose of them (i.e., budgetary, administrative and other bureaucratic constraints).  
Following the advice in the quotation above with respect to an old-model Global 
Hawk UAV (such as the “blast down” suggested previously) may make sense, but 
what action should be taken with a prior-increment destroyer?  DOD policy is 
emphatic on the need to plan for and support systems throughout their lifecycles, but 
it cannot be assumed that doing so is practical, reasonable, or affordable.  For 
example, DODI 5000.2 requires that: 
3.9.2.2. Effective sustainment of weapon systems begins with the design and 
development of reliable and maintainable systems through the continuous 
application of a robust systems engineering methodology. 
[…] 
3.9.2.3. The PM [Program Manager] shall work with the users to document 
performance and support requirements in performance agreements 
specifying objective outcomes, measures, resource commitments, and 
stakeholder responsibilities. The Military Services shall document 
sustainment procedures that ensure integrated combat support. 
Within the context of EA, DODD 5000.2 attempts to address the issue of 
support in the early stages of an acquisition program by requiring a Technology 
Development Strategy (TDS) following Milestone A (Concept Refinement) approval 
(emphasis added): 
3.5.4. […] The TDS shall document the following: 
3.5.4.1. The rationale for adopting an evolutionary strategy (for most 
programs) or a single-step-to-full-capability strategy (e.g., for common supply 
items or COTS [Commercial Off-the-shelf] items). For an evolutionary 
acquisition, either spiral or incremental, the TDS shall include a preliminary 
description of how the program will be divided into technology spirals and 
development increments, an appropriate limitation on the number of prototype 
units that may be produced and deployed during technology development, 
how these units will be supported, and specific performance goals and exit 
criteria that must be met before exceeding the number of prototypes that may 
be produced under the research and development program. 
Similar requirements with respect to logistics support for all acquisition 
programs are also included in guidance on later stages of the acquisition process 
(see DODD 5000.2, paragraphs 3.7.1.1., 3.8.2, and 3.9.2.1).  A Delphi study of Air 
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Force acquisition personnel involved in EA programs found that these requirements 
were not sufficient to ensure adequate support for evolutionary programs, given that 
financial constraints ultimately became the key constraint.  The author defined 
“brick-wall constraints” as “those that cannot be overcome and are considered 
unalterable,” (Wellman, 2003, p. 43) as follows: 
The Government funding process was overwhelmingly identified as one of the 
main constraints in implementing an EA strategy. The main roadblocks 
mentioned were the availability and timing of funds, the color of money, and 
the affordability of the increments. Often, the approved funding level actually 
dictates the requirements. Problems occur when the contractor’s spend plan 
exceeds the approved funding level for the particular program.  
Sufficient and appropriate levels of funding are essential to the success of an 
EA. While suggestions were made on how to improve this process, it should be 
considered a brick-wall constraint since only Congressional intervention will make 
any lasting change (Wellman, 2003, p. 45).  This view has also been supported by 
the Congressional Research Service (2006, May 17). 
Similarly, Dillard has noted that: 
a special challenge is presented for obtaining realistic full funding estimates 
for programs with uncertain requirements and numbers of increments.  If, 
indeed, shorter cycles are facilitated by an EA, skillful financial management 
(programming and budgeting) will be required to effectively enable the 
availability of funding as requirements for successive blocks are realized. 
(Dillard, 2003, September 29, p. 49) 
Dillard, accordingly, believed that EA, combined with increased reporting 
burdens and higher approval levels, could actually lengthen acquisition programs 
(p. 1).  The logistics support process for EA, therefore, finds itself caught between 
lofty, recent and theoretically sufficient direction and the traditional contradictions of 
defense acquisition.  Dillard’s view is supported by the GAO, writing four years after 
the adoption of EA, explaining that, “our work has shown that program managers are 
not empowered to execute acquisition programs nor are they set up to be 
accountable for the results” (GAO, 2007, January).   
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Certainly, EA will exacerbate current support problems unless the increased 
complexity of support associated with EA is at least compensated for by increased, 
dedicated funding and better planning for support requirements.  The increased 
reliance on contractors for almost every aspect of acquisition management also 
stands the chance of increasing the number of levels of management and, thus, the 
potential for distortions of information within the acquisition process. 
Weapon systems have always evolved throughout their lifecycles.  Even a 
single model of a system acquired over a long term will have different “blocks” of 
production with configuration differences.  As well, variants of a single system are 
often produced intentionally, such as single- and two-seat fighter aircraft.  Other 
systems, such as the Boeing B-52H, the Boeing C-135/C-137 
Stratotanker/Stratoliner or the Lockheed Martin C-130 Hercules, exist in innumerable 
configurations.   
An excellent example of long-term, SSFC acquisition that incorporates 
considered evolution is the DDG-51 ARLEIGH BURKE-class destroyer.  The first 
(namesake) ship in this class was ordered in 1985 and commissioned in 1991, yet 
production continues as of 2007.  Current plans call for a total of 62 or more of these 
ships to be built.   The ship has evolved gradually, creating a new “Flight” (or block) 
when certain major changes in configuration or technology occur.   
The DDG-51 class is an example of a well-managed, long-term program that 
uses traditional acquisition processes to deliver weapon systems without the need 
for concurrent activity . (Department of the Navy, Undated; Federation of American 
Scientists, Undated).  In comparison, the upcoming DDG-1000 (ZUMWALT Class 
destroyer) will be built using EA.  Given that this last system has been plagued by 
development delays and renamed several times, the DDG-51 class, with its 
established production line and stable design, may end up including more  ships 
than originally envisaged, serving far more than the usual 30-35 year lifespan for 
Navy combat vessels, because of delays in DDG-1000 development and production, 
which EA may exacerbate (Congressional Research Service, 2006, May 17).   
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The GAO has pointed out that delays in acquiring future systems will mean 
extending the life of (and in some cases manufacturing more copies of) existing 
systems.  For example, major work may be necessary on the Boeing F/A-18 C/D 
Hornet if JSF deliveries lag, and the Boeing F-15E Eagle may need its service life 
extended for the same reason (GAO, 2007, April).  It is difficult to predict which will 
take priority—increased expenditures to maintain legacy systems or increased 
expenditures to buy future systems—but the outlook makes financial decision-
making very challenging  
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From Software to Everywhere 
Given that the DODD and DODI promulgating EA as a “preferred approach” 
date only to 2003, one cannot make even preliminary conclusions about the merits 
of EA or its deficiencies since no systems have yet been fielded in all their 
increments.  We will, therefore, take a look backward to better understand how EA 
became a central concept in major acquisition program management. 
Some discussion of how “policy creep” occurs in government may be of 
interest here.  The software industry has had significant experience with various 
types of “spiral development” conducted using the rigorous norms of the Capability 
Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) of the Software Engineering Institute (SEI), a 
non-profit, Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC).  The 
SEI’s work with respect to defense acquisition is focused on software-intensive 
systems and includes a dedicated CMMI Acquisition Management module, which is 
introduced as follows: 
The congressional and Department of Defense (DOD)-level guidance that 
remains in place emphasizes software acquisition process improvement, 
including the measurement of process performance. The goal of this 
guidance is to influence the outcome of the acquisition process, delivering the 
right capabilities to operational users, on schedule, and at predictable costs. 
One way to meet this goal is through the disciplined application of effective 
acquisition processes. Applying this approach, however, requires renewed 
dedication to defining, implementing, measuring, and maintaining the 
acquisition processes fundamental to a technically sound project.  
The purpose of this document is to define effective and efficient acquisition 
practices that focus on the activities performed by acquisition professionals 
inside the acquisition program office. The best practices also address internal 
program office activities that support the monitoring and control of external 
development contractors and suppliers. Best practices provide a basis for 
acquisition process discipline, while balancing the need for agility. Note, 
however, that this report identifies acquisition practices that should be 
implemented, but does not prescribe specific implementation approaches. 
(Software Engineering Institute, 2005, May). 
The SEI’s work on EA (which they term “software acquisition process 
improvement”), therefore, assumes that a coherent management-control framework 
 - 20 - 
is in place, giving sufficient guidance to program managers and minimizing 
contradictory guidance.  Additionally, specific approaches (i.e., just how to do EA) 
are not provided.  Other SEI publications delve more into implementation, but once 
more, usually envisage a certain managerial or leadership framework. 
Spiral development’s success in the software industry was “acquired” by 
OSD; the process may have found its way into top-level guidance on all DOD 
acquisition without policy-makers adequately addressing the complexities of 
implementation, unforeseen additional costs, or impact on logistics support.  As a 
RAND report has explained, “EA was first applied to software-dominated Command, 
Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) systems in which change was 
occurring so rapidly that is was difficult to define in detail the operational capabilities 
before starting EMD [Engineering Manufacturing and Development]” (Stern, Boito & 
Younossi, 2006, p. 48).   
While modern software, particularly for weapon systems, can be extremely 
complex, it does not have the physical qualities and support requirements 
associated with, for example, a tank or a ship.  Nevertheless, software requirements 
for modern systems have become a significant factor in acquisition; for example, the 
AC-130 Spooky gunship is reputed to be the most complex aircraft currently flying, 
incorporating over 609,000 lines of software code in multiple mission systems 
(Federation of American Scientists, Undated). 
In effect, the “technology transfer” of the CMMI as a conceptual (and probably 
successful) software acquisition approach within SEI to EA as a cornerstone policy 
for all acquisitions within the DODI 5000.1 and DODD 5000.2 major acquisition 
program framework may have occurred a little too brusquely, borne partly out of 
frustration with the perceived inadequacies of the DOD acquisition process we 
described earlier.   
Additionally, studies exploring the CMMI’s potential use beyond software 
acquisition, such as one by the Aerospace Corporation (another FFRDC), may have 
played a role in influencing the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s policy-makers 
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(Hantos, 2005, September 30).  The result, unfortunately, may end up complicating 
an already complex system and further increasing cost while degrading acquisition 
cycle-time and supportability, as suggested by Dillard (2003, September 29).   
The RAND study mentioned above qualified its support for the EA concept by 
stating that: 
the [EA] process requires additional capability to be released in a series of 
overlapping “spirals.”  Each spiral has some dependence on the work from 
the previous spiral but also adds unique capability.  Each spiral also has its 
own oversight review process that needs to be addressed. 
EA would seem to increase the complexity of the effort required by SE/PM 
[systems engineering/program management] personnel because requirements must 
be redefined for each successive iteration or spiral. Presumably, this constant 
change in the development baseline, in which one design will be fielded in the short 
term while another design is being developed, makes it difficult to maintain 
configuration control of the different systems resulting from each spiral. This 
situation results in a continual trade-off among changing needs and desired 
capability and the finite resources to perform a task. (Stern et al., 2006, p. 118-119; 
emphasis added) 
Given the oft-repeated concerns about the support of traditionally acquired 
systems we discussed previously, it would seem reasonable to speculate that 
logistics requirements for EA programs will fall even farther down the list of priorities 
given the “finite resources” (generally money and manpower, but sometimes 
technology) at the PM’s or contractor’s disposal.   The financial management and 
support issues associated with the acquisition of the Global Hawk unmanned aerial 
vehicle, a relatively small program, may be a harbinger of what can be expected 
when EA begins to be implemented throughout the acquisition community: 
Another complication mentioned by the Global Hawk cost analyst is that SD 
runs counter to the sequence of development, production, and operating and 
support lifecycle phases.  Successive spirals being released to the end-user result in 
overlap of the lifecycle phases. A change in design could affect the building of units 
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that are currently in production or could require retrofits for units that are already 
fielded. These concurrent phases require a large amount of coordination at all times 
to ensure that the program strategy is continuously followed between the program 
phases. 
The implications of the complexities of EA for cost estimating are that while 
EA possibly reduces technical risk by allowing for partial solutions to be fielded more 
quickly, it may incur increased costs due to increased coordination, integration, and 
logistics activities for SE/PM. Estimators should divide their SE/PM cost estimates 
into two parts: the SE/PM cost related to specific spirals or increments and the 
“overlay” SE/PM cost for the effort that continues across multiple spirals and that 
provides consistency of overall program direction.  Because each spiral or increment 
may be shifted in the schedule according to the priorities of the program’s end-users, 
estimators must be able to determine the unique amount of SE/PM cost required for 
each spiral or increment. This ability allows for rapid, modular changes to be made 
to the cost estimate. Also, logistics planners prefer that design changes be “settled 
out” before performing a full LSA [Logistics Support Analysis]. However, the rush to 
field systems may push a system to the user before a logistics infrastructure has 
been established to support the fielded units. Also, as various spirals are fielded, 
they may or may not include retrofitting to bring older units in line with a common 
configuration, making configuration control difficult to maintain (Stern et al., 2006, p. 
120; emphasis added). 
Similarly, it has been noted, “The logistics community must buy into having 
multiple configurations fielded. Fortunately, commonality and modularity at the 
component and subcomponent level should help reduce some of the logistics 
burden” (Johnson & Birmingham, 2005). This would appear to be somewhat of an 
understatement.  As is often the case in government, policies such as the 2003 5000 
Directives are somewhat lacking in a sound approach to implementation.   
The traditional solution, as offered in the above quotation, is to blame 
working-level staff members (in this case logisticians, maintenance or engineering 
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staffs) for inadequate “buy-in” or resistance to change.  Senior-level policy-makers 
bear the responsibility for being evaluated on the results of their work in terms of 
implementation of policy, not simply its publication.  This shift in thinking and reward 
mechanisms, which has occurred throughout the major Commonwealth nations 
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom)  since the 1980s, is 
known as “New Public Management” (NPM) or now simply “Public Management.”3   
A key part of NPM is the reduction in the legislative and regulatory burden 
faced by senior officials so that better performance can be expected at lower cost.  
The DOD has not adopted any notable aspect of EA and preserves its existing 
“checks and balances” regime of statutory and regulatory controls over every aspect 
of DOD business (including contracting), none of which were relaxed with the 
creation of EA.  The issues of whether the US is simply lagging by inertia in its 
implementation of public management concepts, or whether the true reasons are 
political or constitutional, are of interest; but, unfortunately, they are beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
Accordingly, the DOD could arguably be left with a collection of unsupportable 
and incompatible systems that took little or no less time to develop than under the 
traditional single-stage acquisition (and logistics planning) process.  And the 
increased workload on PMs imposed by EA may end up degrading the potential for 
the later increments of a system to be developed, manufactured, fielded or 
supported.  As suggested by three faculty members at the Air Force Institute of 
Technology, under EA, “Configuration management deserves increased attention 
[…] each increment must be fully supportable in an affordable manner” (Farmer, 
Frichtman & Farkas, 2003).  
                                            
3 For a sound overview of these changes, see Barzelay (2001).  For a comprehensive examination of 
public management in the US and other nations from a comparative perspective see Pollitt and 
Bouckaert (2004).  See also Jones and Kettl (2003). 
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Toward a Workable Approach 
The “Conspiracy of Hope” (in which cost and time is underestimated) 
mentioned in the Report of the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment 
project4 is only one of the paradoxes affecting the DOD major systems acquisition 
process.  Another is the inevitable paradox between the perceptual short-term 
timeframes of senior decision-makers (who are on the job for only a few years, 
whether they are flag officers or political appointees) and the long-term nature of the 
approval, development, production, fielding and operation of major systems.   
From the perspective of the New Public Management paradigm mentioned 
above, this system makes no sense as it is impossible to hold senior management 
accountable because it is impossible to make any reference to actual 
implementation. 
The solution, as some DOD policy-makers have suggested when a crisis 
occurs or when the opportunity arises to make new policy, is to increase “discipline” 
and “buy-in” because program offices and other staff involved with actually 
supporting these systems need to change their behavior (Stern et al., 2006, p. 120).  
Dillard has pointed out that the 2003 amendments implementing EA as a “preferred 
approach” will, in fact, further degrade the capability of staffs to “get with the 
program” and, supposedly, to deliver and field major systems on time and at the 
originally planned cost (Dillard, 2003, September 29, p. 1). 
Since support issues such as logistics are, by definition, “downstream” issues 
which will fall to the bottom of the priority list during the peak years of effort on 
weapon systems, a practical solution is needed.  The fact that those PMs who 
happen to work on systems that use the “preferred approach” of EA will be working 
on several increments concurrently that are at different stages in the acquisition 
process can only be seen as exacerbating the problem, even with the requirement of 
                                            
4 See note 3 above. 
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“user feedback” from prior increments (DOD, 2003, November 24, paragraph 
3.3.2.1; DOD, 2003, May 12, paragraph 3.3; emphasis added). 
In our research, we were struck by the importance and independence of 
operational testing and evaluation (OT&E) at various stages of the acquisition 
process.  Under current rules, the OT&E process has to be repeated at each 
required stage for each spiral.  In a parallel vein, both the GAO and the DOD are 
placing emphasis on “technology maturity,” a term perhaps borrowed from NASA’s 
use of “Technology Readiness Levels” (TRLs) and the SEI’s use of the Capability 
Maturity Model Integration (NASA, Undated,;  Software Engineering Institute, 2005, 
May). 
We would suggest that there are two preconditions to ensuring adequate 
logistics support for major systems acquired under EA.  First, the definition of OT&E 
and related independent testing must include all aspects of logistics for each 
increment of a fielded system.  If “logistics readiness levels” do not meet established 
standards, corrective action must be taken on both the fielded increments and any 
subsequent increments under development or production. 
The systems and logistics commands of the services and the Defense 
Logistics Agency (DLA) would have an important role to play in the above process 
as well.  From the inception, they must set standards for logistics readiness levels 
that are relevant to their environment and to the environment of the logistician, 
maintainer, or other individual in the field that is supporting the system.  These 
standards-driven logistics assessments must be integrated into the milestone 
decision process for major systems.5 
While the elevation of logistics support to the same level as OT&E in terms of 
independence and influence on the milestone approval process may seem 
ambitious, it represents a degree of recognition that certain inherent characteristics 
of the DOD are essentially permanent.  Additionally, the bulging PM workload, 
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already seriously compromised by the inadequate funding of weapon systems and a 
significant loss of many thousands of qualified government employees essential to 
acquisition and logistics functions will only increase further under EA.  The logistics 
readiness level “showstopper” will, if used effectively, assist in freezing further work 
until support issues with previous or current increments are resolved. 
Admittedly, measuring logistics performance with respect to a single weapon 
system is particularly difficult.  This is caused by the “horizontal” nature of logistics: 
physical goods on their way to an operational unit (or on their way back for purposes 
such as repair, modification, or disposal) cross many different chains of command 
and involve a variety of commercial transportation and logistics providers.  In 
addition, extensive outsourcing of both weapons system support (sometimes called 
“product support”), transportation, and logistics activities (which can be bundled in 
almost any fashion) create a complex patchwork of public- and private-sector 
activities that can vary not only based on the type of item being supplied, but the 
origin and destination of that item. 
It should also be noted that the overwhelming public focus of the Defense 
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission’s report was on base closures, 
a little-discussed section dealt with material management and distribution.   
Under these recommendations—which are now in effect—all inventory 
control, management, and distribution of reparable and other items now managed by 
the individual services is to be reassigned to the DLA, which currently manages 
mostly consumable and commercial-type items (Defense BRAC Commission, 2005, 
September 18, pp. 271-279).  The DLA's Integrated Data Environment (IDE) and 
USTRANSCOM's Global Transportation Network (GTN), the two major systems 
currently managing centralized distribution, are to be merged by the end of FY09 
(DLA, 2006, February, p. 9). 
                                                                                                                                       
5 An example of a publication that could be used as a starting point for such an effort is Department of 
the Navy (2006, September). 
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Conclusion 
Evolutionary Acquisition was conceived to resolve an acquisition and funding 
problem at the Pentagon level, with the added necessary element that support to the 
warfighter would be expected as well.  However, as discussed, EA as currently 
designed threatens to undermine logistics support and operational availability.  
Perhaps this is because EA was quickly adapted from the software environment to 
the full range of weapon systems, or because support considerations were not a 
priority in preparing the 2003 versions of DODI 5000.1 and DODD 5000.2.  
Regardless, EA remains a “preferred approach,” and it will be interesting to see how 
many major acquisition programs adopt this methodology. 
We suggest that for EA to maintain or enhance logistics support at the 
operational level, logistics considerations must be integrated into independent 
operational testing and into concepts of technology or capability maturity.  This may 
be a radical shift in thinking, which may increase tensions related to the fielding of 
unsupported or unsupportable equipment throughout the DOD.  Whether or not this 
“user feedback,” as explained in DODD 5000.2, is actually incorporated into the 
criteria for milestone approval for subsequent increments will be a good indicator of 
how seriously logistics factors will be incorporated into the fielding of future weapon 
systems. 
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